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Westby: Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - A Constitutional Protectio

CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-A Constitutional Protection or a Formality to Sidestep in Successive
Prosecutions? Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074 (Wyo. 1992).
"Justice for all" were the words on the shirt' worn by Sharon
Ewell when Jetty Lee Harvey, the man who had helped abduct her
six years before, 2 was taken to the penitentiary. The delays in this
case proved to be frustrating for the defendants as well as for the
victim, and caused a great deal of controversy within the general and
legal communities.'
The crime was actually committed on January 5, 1986, in Rock
Springs, Wyoming. Jetty Lee Harvey and David Swazo were riding
in a pickup truck driven by Everett Phillips. 4 Phillips saw Sharon
Ewell on the street and told Harvey and Swazo that he "wanted to
grab her". 5 Subsequently, Phillips turned the truck around and Harvey
asked Ewell if she wanted a ride. 6 Ewell tried to ignore the men, but
Harvey got out and forced her into the truck.7 Once in the truck,
Swazo forced her to engage in sexual intercourse while Harvey and
Phillips laughed and jeered. 8 Phillips then stopped the truck, and
began to remove his pants. 9 Fortunately for Sharon Ewell, a pizza
delivery man witnessed the abduction and called the police.' 0 Three
police cars responded to the call and rescued Sharon Ewell. All three
men were arrested" and later charged with crimes connected to the
assault.

1. DAILY TIMEs NEWSPAPER, (Rawlins, Wyoming), July 25, 1992, at I (photograph)
2. Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989) [hereinafter Harvey I].
3. The Supreme Court reversed Harvey's conviction as well as that of Everett Phillips
on the grounds that the two had been denied speedy trials as guaranteed by United States
Constitution. There were strong dissenting opinions by Justices Thomas and Golden. Harvey
v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989); Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989).
There was extensive publicity concerning this Supreme Court decision, and the three Justices
concurring in the decision were subject to abuse. See Brief for the Appellant at Appendix,
Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074 (Wyo. 1992) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellant].
4. Harvey 1, 774 P.2d at 90.
5. Trial Transcript at 1097-1104 (Vol. IV), Harvey I, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989).
6. Harvey 1, 774 P.2d 87, 90 (Wyo. 1989).
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Harvey I, 774 P.2d 87, 90. The police arrived before Phillips actually assaulted Ewell.
I1. Id. at 90; See also Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118.
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On January 6, 1986,12 Sweetwater County and the prosecuting
attorney charged Harvey with kidnapping, sexual assault, and aiding
and abetting those crimes. On July 21, 1987, more than a year and
a half later, a jury found Harvey guilty of kidnapping and sexual
assault. 3 The jury acquitted on the aiding and abetting charge. The
defendant appealed the conviction to the Wyoming Supreme Court
claiming a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to a speedy trial4
because of the year and a half delay in bringing the case to trial.'
The court reversed the conviction finding a speedy trial violation and
ordered the trial court dismiss the information against the Appellant
on July 3, 1989.'1
There was considerable public interest surrounding this case and
6
extensive news coverage of the Harvey and Phillips decisions.' The
7
prosecution was criticized for the delays that caused the acquittal.
In the midst of the controversy, the prosecuting attorney for
Sweetwater County called a press conference to announce the filing
of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to commit sexual
assault charges" against Harvey and Phillips.1 9
Harvey's preliminary hearing on these charges took place on
September 27, 1989. On December 18, 1989, the district court granted
Harvey's motion to certify certain constitutional questions regarding
double jeopardy and self-incriminating statements to the Wyoming
Supreme Court,2 0 but the court remanded to the district court with
the questions unanswered. A writ of prohibition regarding the double
jeopardy issue was filed by Harvey on July 25, 1989, but was rejected
by the Wyoming Supreme Court. 2' On January 17, 1990, four years
following the commission of the crime, a jury found Harvey guilty
of conspiracy to commit2 kidnapping and not guilty of conspiracy to
commit sexual assault.1
12. David Swazo and Everett Phillips were charged with the same offenses. David Swazo
pled guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence and is presently serving time in the Wyoming
Penitentiary. Everett Phillips' case is almost identical to the Harvey case and the Wyoming
Supreme Court decision should be out soon. Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 (Wyo. 1992).
13. Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989).
14. Brief for the Appellant at 2. Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074 (Wyo. 1992).
15. A petition by the prosecution for reconsideration of the rulings was denied, and the
court issued a mandate to the district court to dismiss the charges. Brief for the Appellant at
3.
16. Brief for the Appellant, Appendix D p. 1-29.
17. The district court did not keep adequate records of the proceedings that occurred
between January 1986 and July 1987 to document. the reasons for the continuances. There was
a turnover in the prosecutors office which also caused some delays. Harvey 1, 774 P.2d 87.
18. Conspiracy to commit kidnapping (WYo. STAT. §§ 6-1-303(a) (1988), 6-2-201 (a)(ii)
& (d) (1988), and 6-2-302 (a)(i) (1988); conspiracy to commit sexual assault in the first degree
(WYO.

STAT. § 6-1-303 (a)

(1988)).

19. David Swazo was not charged because he had pled guilty to the first charges.
20. Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Wyo. 1992) [hereinafter Harvey II].

21. Id.at 1076.
22. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss2/7

2

Westby: Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - A Constitutional Protectio
1993

CASENOTES

Harvey appealed the conspiracy conviction to the Wyoming
Supreme Court. He argued that use of the same evidence to prove
conspiracy as was used in the earlier trial for kidnapping and sexual
assault violated his Fifth Amendment protection against double
jeopardy. 23 The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the conviction and
ruled that the substantive crime and conspiracy to commit that crime
were not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. The Court
two prosecutions
also held that "a mere overlap of proof between
24
did not establish a double jeopardy violation."
This casenote will briefly discuss the development of the Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy, where it stands today,
and how the Federal Courts vary in their interpretation of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions. The casenote then
demonstrates the inconsistencies of the Harvey decision with the United
States Supreme Court as well as other federal courts. Finally, this
casenote will advocate a mandatory joinder statute as a solution to
the problem of inconsistent double jeopardy analyses.
BACKGROUND

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that no person "shall... be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." '25 The double jeopardy provision
protects defendants from successive and therefore oppressive prosecutions.
The United States Constitution as well as the Wyoming Constitution provide double jeopardy protection in three situations 26. The
protection bars a second prosecution for the same offense after ac-

23. Id. at 1076. The Harvey opinion also addressed three other issues in addition to the
double jeopardy issue:
1. Had the appellant's right to a speedy trial been denied by reason of the second

prosecution?
2. Had the appellant been deprived of his right to a public trial by an impartial
jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
having to defend himself against conspiracy charges to a jury of persons who were
aware of his prior conviction on the underlying substantive offenses from inflammatory pretrial publicity?
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing statements made by
the Appellant at the allocution portion of his sentencing hearing following his initial
conviction to be used against him in the second prosecution in violation of Appellant's
constitutional rights to silence and due process?
24. Harvey II, 835 P.2d 1074, (citing) United States v. Felix, 112 S.Ct. 1377 (1992));
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990): Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932);
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)).
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
26. These three situations are interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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quittal as well as a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after
27
conviction. It also bars multiple punishment for the same offense,
unless the legislature intended multiple punishments."
Federal Case Law
Blockburger v. United States, 29 decided in 1932, established the
test for determining what constitutes the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes. This case involved two convictions, one for selling
morphine not in the original stamped package and the second for
executing a sale without a written order by the purchaser. 30 The court
reviewed the consecutive sentences and cumulative fines imposed by
the trial court. 3 The test that was used was based on the specific
elements of the crimes charged. If there was at least one different
element in each offense charged, double jeopardy did not apply. 32
This theory was significantly broadened in Grady v. Corbin,3" by
the United States Supreme Court's focus on the defendants conduct. 4
In Grady, the defendant was at fault in an automobile collision that
caused the death of the driver in the other car. He was charged and
pled guilty to driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to the
right side of the road.35 At the time the defendant was initially charged,
neither the prosecutor nor the police were aware of the fact that the
driver of the other vehicle had died as a result of the accident.3 6 The
state then brought a separate charge of vehicular manslaughter against
the defendant for which he was also convicted. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court found that this second charge constituted a
double jeopardy violation 7 because the state was attempting to prove

27. The Wyoming case, Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117, 1118 (Wyo. 1987) discusses the
issue of whether or not consecutive sentences imposed for felony murder and the underlying
felony violated the double jeopardy clause. Birr was overruled in 1992 by Cook v. State, 841
P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1992).
28. The court cannot impose multiple punishment unless the legislature has specifically
provided for multiple punishment and the punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Whalen v. State, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
29. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Id.at 304. This test is referred to as the "Blockburger" or "Same Evidence" approach. This is the established test for determining whether successive prosecutions arising out
of the same events are for the "same offense".
33. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
34. Id. at 509.
35. Id. at 511.
36. Id.at 509
37. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of Appeals in a 54 decision. See Casenote, An Unsuccessful Effort to Define "Same Offense", 25 GA. L. Rav.
143, 145 (1990).
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the same conduct, using the traffic offenses, to which the defendant
had pled guilty in the first trial. 8
In his opinion for the United States Supreme Court in Grady39 ,
Justice Brennan stated that, "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a
subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted. '" 4 This case established a new two-level test
that defines
"same offense" using the conduct of the defendant.4' 1
At the time of the Harvey decision, the Grady test had been
applied in many federal courts as well as state courts. In United States
v. Felix,42 decided two years after Grady, the United States Supreme
Court stated that the decision in Grady did not bar a second prosecution for conspiracy in a case involving a series of criminal activities. 43 The Felix case involved federal prosecutions for drug related
activities by the defendant in Oklahoma and Missouri. Felix was tried
and convicted in Missouri for the substantive drug offense of operation of a drug manufacturing facility. In this first trial, evidence
of other offenses that took place in Oklahoma was used to show
intent." Felix was then tried in Oklahoma for conspiracy in connection with the operation of a drug manufacturing facility, the substantive offense in the first trial. The Supreme Court stated in its
decision that the "actual crimes charged in each case were different
in both time and place; there'45 was absolutely no common conduct
linking the alleged offenses."
The Supreme Court in Felix equated this case with "Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization" (RICO) and "Continuing
Criminal Enterprises" (CCE) cases because these 4type
of offenses
7
involve ongoing crimes, not a single discrete crime.

38. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990). The Court found that the state was going to use the
two charges for which Corbin had already pled guilty, to get the conviction for second degree
vehicular manslaughter. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 523. This was one of the last opinions written by Justice Brennan before he
retired.
41. Id. The two-level test involves an analysis of the elements of the crimes charged, and
then if necessary a second analysis under a "conduct test."
42. 112 S.Ct. 1377 (1992).
43. Id at 1379-80.
44. Id at 1380.
45. Id at 1382.
46. RICO cases because they deal with criminal organizations, and CCE cases because
they deal with criminal operations, require a substantive offense as well as proof that the
activities are ongoing in order to prove a violation.
47. RICO charges are used to prosecute organized criminal operations. CCE requires a
series of related offenses by the defendant before this charge will be filed. United States v.
O'Connor, 953 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Federal Courts have been applying this rationale to establish an
exception to the Grady test for these two specific types of prosecutions. In United States v. O'Connor, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals used this exception to allow predicate acts for which the
defendant had already been tried, to be used in a subsequent RICO
prosecution.4 8 O'Connor had previously been prosecuted for receipt
of stolen goods from interstate commerce, wire fraud, and other predicate acts which were used to prove the RICO charges. 4 9 The court
held that because RICO charges are based on a series of criminal
acts, the use of previously tried charges did not violate the double
jeopardy clause under the Grady analysis.
In United States v. Gambino5 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also held that under Grady, previously tried charges are admissible in CCE and RICO charges. The court further found that
the conspiracy charge in the second case was barred by the "same
conduct" test. The defendants in this case were charged with conspiracy to import and distribute heroin and cocaine and also CCE
and Rico charges stemming from these activities. The court vacated
the conspiracy conviction which "rested at least partially on overt
acts for which the defendants had been previously prosecuted." 2 The
court upheld RICO and CCE convictions obtained in a similar manner as those in O'Connor. O'Connor illustrates the clear distinction
made by the court between single discrete crimes and the ongoing
criminal activity crimes, as far as double jeopardy issues are concerned.
In United States v. Calderone," the court specifically addressed
conspiracy charges as they related to the holding in Grady. The court
stated that the "same conduct" test applied equally to successive prosecutions in a single transaction case, such as Grady, and conspiracy
cases.5 4 Calderone was acquitted on charges of participating in a wideranging drug conspiracy and the Court held that the acquittal barred
a subsequent and narrower conspiracy charge." The court emphasized
that Grady is applicable only to single transaction cases. The court
distinguished CCE and RICO cases because Congress intended that
the conduct proved in the earlier case would be used in the second

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 341.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 342. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
920 F.2d 1108, 1111-13 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 54, (1991).
Id. at 1111.
917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990)
Id. at 721.

55. Id.
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prosecution for these types of crimes. 5 6 The courts decision turned
on the fact that under Grady a second prosecution was barred when
the same conduct would be shown to establish an "agreement" that
differed from the first charge only because of the wording in the
indictment.
Since the Grady decision, two new members have been appointed
to the United States Supreme Court making the future in this area
uncertain. Under federal case law, the applicable standard in cases
involving double jeopardy was already somewhat unclear. The Wyoming Supreme Court has also had difficulty clarifying the proper test
and devising an analysis that will work to protect defendants but not
unnecessarily burden prosecutors. This, as well as the tentativeness
in the court's few decisions in this area make the level of double
jeopardy protection in Wyoming hard to determine.
The Law in Wyoming
Some states have limited the application of the Grady test 7 to
offenses arising out of a single fact situation.5 8 Other state courts
allow a broad application of the test, by not allowing the same evidence to be used to prove substantially different offenses arising out
of a continuing series of fact situations. 9
The cases in Wyoming follow a similar evolution in their double
jeopardy analyses as the United States Supreme Court cases. In Vigil
v. State,60 the court originally adopted the Blockburger test, stating
that the "Wyoming Constitution and the United States Constitution
have the same meaning and are coextensive in application." In Vigil,
the court allowed the jury to return five verdicts for five counts of

56. Id. at 721. See also United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1990) (the
court held that the conduct needed to prove the RICO charge was different than that needed
to prove a racketeering charge).
57. Vestal & Gilbert, Preclusion of Duplicative Prosecution: A Developing Mosaic, 47
Mo. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1982). "The phrase 'same offense' in the double jeopardy clause readily
lends itself to two interpretations." This article was written long before the decision in Grady,
but it points out the fact that there has always been confusion about the protection provided
by the due process clause.
Grady was a five to four opinion and its "same conduct" test to determine the same
offense for double jeopardy purposes has been criticized as being too easily misapplied and
misinterpreted. In Casenote: An Unsuccessful Effort to Define "Same Offense", 25 GA. L.
REv., 143-166 (1990), Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990) is used as an example
of how the "same conduct" test is easily misapplied.
58. Harvey 11, 835 P.2d 1074 (Wyo. 1992) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). See, e.g., State v.
Hope, 215 Conn. 570, 577 A.2d 1000 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 968 (1991); Dixon v.
State, 584 So.2d 195 (Fla. App. 1991); Harrelson v. State, 569 So.2d 295 (Miss. 1990).
59. There are numerous state court decisions. See, e.g., State v. Hope, 577 A.2d 1000
(1990); Dixon v. State, 584 So.2d 195 (Fla. App. 1991); Jivers v. State, 406 S.E.2d 154 (S.C.
1991).
60. 563 P.2d 1344 (Wyo. 1977)
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assault with a deadly weapon.when the defendant had fired a gun
at a car full of people. 6' Vigil62 only received one sentence, and the
court upheld the five verdicts.
In 1986, the Wyoming Supreme Court altered the Vigil test to
63
adopt a "same evidence" rule with its decision in State v. Carter.
In Carter, the defendant was charged with possession with intent to
sell hash and with delivery of marijuana. The court upheld the convictions because at the time of arrest Carter had just completed a
sale of marijuana but was still negotiating a sale of hash.4 The court
stated that because the state did not use the same evidence to obtain
the convictions it did not violate the defendant's double jeopardy
protection. 65 The "same evidence" rule is an even broader application
of double jeopardy protection than the "same conduct" test from
Grady.
Birr v. State6 discussed double jeopardy as it applies to multiple
punishments in Wyoming. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that
the double jeopardy clause prohibited multiple punishments for the
same offense unless specifically authorized by the legislature. 67 In this
case, the court found that.felony murder and the underlying felony
of robbery were distinct offenses and that consecutive sentences were
valid because the legislature intended separate punishments. 6
Birr was overruled in 1992 by Cook v. State.6 9 The court held
that separate sentences could not be imposed for convictions of felony
murder and the underlying offense. The defendants in Cook pled
guilty to felony murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.70 They were sentenced for each offense with
the terms to run consecutively. 7' The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the multiple punishments and overruled Birr2 The court cited
Grady in their discussion of the test that should be used in determining a double jeopardy violation. 73 The court held that multiple
punishments were not authorized by the legislature and that courts

61. Id. at 1346.
62. Id. at 1349.
63. 714 P.2d 1217 (Wyo 1986)
64. Id. at 1219.
65. Id. at 1220.
66. 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo 1987).

67. Id. at 1122.
68. See Casenote Consecutive Sentences for Felony Murder and the Underlying Felony:
Double Jeopardy or Legislative Intent? Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987), 23 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 603 (1988). This note criticizes the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Birr
because it goes against the long established principle in favor of lenity and construing the
statute in favor of the defendant.
69. Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1992).
70. Id. at 1346.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1350 (citing Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987)).
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imposing these sentences were violating the protection against double
jeopardy .14
The Wyoming Supreme Court has chosen to view the decision
in Grady as applying only to identical charges for the same offense.
In his dissent in Harvey, 75 Justice Urbigkit stated that this was an
76
unfortunate limitation to an extremely important constitutional right.
PRINCIPAL CASE

The majority opinion in Harvey v. State 7 begins with a quote
from Grady" defining the "same conduct" test and explaining how
it was limited by United States v. Felix.79 The majority stated that
Felix "resolved the uncertainty and confusion created by Grady"80
by clarifying that the substantive crime and conspiracy are separate
and distinct offenses."'
In Harvey, the Wyoming Supreme Court focused on the differences in the conduct constituting the two offenses.82 The court also
looked at the wording in the Wyoming statutes to show the conduct
necessary to prove the elements of each offense.8 3 The court acknowledged the fact that the same evidence was used to prove both
offenses. The content of the opening and closing statements, the jury
instructions, and much of the same testimony were the same in both
trials. The court upheld the verdict in spite of these repetitions holding
that "a mere overlap of proof between two prosecutions does not
establish a double jeopardy violation." 4
The Wyoming Supreme Court uses a Blockburger analysis to
determine that an agreement beforehand, which is an element of conspiracy, is not an element of the substantive crime. 5 Also, the court
held that the overlapping testimony and evidence went to prove one
element of conspiracy which was not an element of either kidnapping
74. Id. at 1346.
75. Harvey II, 835 P.2d 1074.
76. Another case pending in Wyoming addresses a similar question as the one in Harvey
II. In Longstreth v. State case the defendant was originally charged with burglary with intent
to commit arson. The Wyoming Supreme Court denied a petition for prohibition. The State
then charged Longstreth with felony destruction of property and the case is set for trial in
Evanston the week of February 22, 1993. Longstreth v. State, No. 91-81.
77. Harvey II,835 P.2d 1074, 1077.
78. See text accompanying notes 42-45. The prosecution argued that the rule in Grady
oversimplified the double jeopardy clause. 835 P.2d 1074.
79. 112 S.Ct. 1377.
80. The Felix case stated that conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate offenses for double jeopardy considerations.
81. The Court in Felix cited several early cases for this proposition, See, e.g., United
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
82. Harvey 1I, 835 P.2d 1074, 1077.
83. Id. at 1078.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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or sexual assault. Since the evidence was not used to prove the un-6
derlying offense it did not constitute a double jeopardy violation.1
The State argued that for double jeopardy to be invoked there
has to be more than a single valid prosecution.87 The prosecution
must result in an acquittal or a conviction. 8 In this case, the jury
decided all issues of fact against Harvey and his conviction and sentence were set aside on appeal. The State argued that because of this
there was no conviction.8 9 The reason for the reversal by the supreme
court in the Harvey case was a speedy trial violation, but there was
a valid prosecution as well as a conviction.
Justice Urbigkit in his dissent advocated adoption of a joinder
statute to eliminate the possibility of this limited view of double jeopardy being used as a prosecutorial tool to retry a person if the first
prosecution is not successful. 90 Any charge which involves more than
one party can involve a contention of conspiracy or an agreement
beforehand between the parties to commit the crime. Therefore, there
would always be the possibility of getting a second chance if the
conspiracy charge is held back. In addition, charges of solicitation,
9
attempt, accessory before the fact, accessory after the fact, and the
proceedings.
different
in
six
actual offense could all be brought
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court's failure to apply the double jeopardy analysis as it was established in Grady v. Corbin resulted in an
incorrect holding in the Harvey case. 92 Under the current "same conduct" test, the second prosecution for conspiracy should have been
93
barred by the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy.

86. Id.
87. Brief for the Appellees at 15, Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, [hereinafter, Brief for
the Appellees].
88. Brief for the Appellees at 7. (If there is a conviction, then there must be a punishment
imposed).
89. If setting aside a decision on appeal would circumvent the double jeopardy protection,
this would be the standard tactic to use in this situation. There was a valid conviction in the
first trial even though it was set aside, and double jeopardy should have attached to all subsequent charges.
90. Justice Urbigkit discussed the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice 13-2.3 and the ALI
Model Penal Code for the Joinder Statutes.
The dissent also stated that this decision, in essence, does away with collateral estoppel
in the double jeopardy context. See Ashe v. Swensen, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
91. Conspiracy, WYo STAT. § 6-1-303 (1988); Solicitation, Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-302 (1988);
Attempt, WYo. STAT. § 6-1-301 (1988); Accessory before the fact, WYo. STAT. § 6-1-201 (1988);
Accessory after the fact, Wyo. STAT. § 6-5-202 (1988).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
93. In Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990), the defendant went through two
separate trials for two unrelated robberies. The Court allowed the victim of the first robbery
to testify at the second trial. In Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Grady she found the
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The ConstitutionalProtection
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-

antees that "no person shall be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."9 When Jetty Lee Harvey's
conviction was overturned by the Wyoming State Supreme Court,
because he was not given a speedy trial, all further prosecutions for
the same offense were barred under the traditional interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment. 95 The State should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for the same criminal act."
Successive, and therefore oppressive, prosecutions by the State
after failed attempts to convict are obviously the reason for the Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy. 97 It is unfortunate
that in this instance the prosecution lost a conviction, but there are
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and the right to
a speedy trial is one of those rights. 9 The prosecution argued that
this was a mere technicality and the case should have been decided
on the merits, but the fundamental rights upon which our judicial
system is based are not mere technicalities." 9
Application of Grady
In Harvey, The Wyoming Supreme Court distinguished the Grady

decision and therefore could decide this case under a much narrowed
double jeopardy protection analysis. The majority cited the decision
in Felix to support the proposition that successive prosecutions for

decisions in Dowling and Grady to be inconsistent. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)
(O'Connor, J, dissenting). United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990), applied
the "same conduct" test to a drug conspiracy case. Each judge in the plurality and the dissenting
judge came up with different interpretations of the test.
94. U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
95. Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
96. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969). The decision in Benton overruled
Palko v. Maryland, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) which used a totality of circumstances test to say that
a basic constitutional right can be denied as long as there is not a denial of "fundamental
fairness."
97. A speedy trial violation bars the prosecution from bringing the case. The reason for
this remedy is to deter future delays and to guarantee the right to a speedy trial. In this instance
the only result of the violation was that the State had a second chance to prosecute. This type
of violation differs from a claim by the defense that the trial they were given was unfair, where
the remedy would be a new trial. The speedy trial violation results in barring the prosecution,
not in allowing an even longer time before the defendant is brought to trial.
98. The Court, in Grady stated that prosecution offices are often overworked but that
does not excuse the need for scrupulous adherence to our constitutional principles.
99. Brief for the Appellees.
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a crime and conspiracy to commit that crime do not violate the double
jeopardy clause.' ° However, in Felix the United States Supreme Court
relied on the fact that the offenses were committed in different states
and involved separate criminal conduct.' 0' In the Harvey case, the
Wyoming Supreme Court was looking at offenses stemming from the
same criminal conduct in a single occurrence, therefore, Felix should
not be applied over the Grady test.
The confusion about the double jeopardy clause is evident
throughout the Harvey case. The prosecutor admitted to the media
that the conspiracy charges filed against Harvey did not involve a
"different transaction" but that they were not filing identical charges
to "avoid falling into a double jeopardy trap."' 12 The media drew
attention to the fact that the convictions were set aside as a result
of delays by the prosecution. The subsequent public outcry resulted
in the filing of the second charges. 03
The decision in Grady"0 should have been applied to the Harvey
case because the charges arose out of a single occurrence or transaction. 0 1 Using the "same conduct" test, the second charge for conspiracy would have been barred. Under Calderone,106 the only
difference in the two charges would be the agreement before hand
and that is not enough to avoid a double jeopardy violation. 0 7
The Law in Wyoming
Wyoming has a unique problem concerning double jeopardy because no statute of limitations exists for bringing criminal actions.
This, in theory, and more realistically, after the court's decision in
Harvey, could lead to a common usage of multiple attempts by the
prosecution to convict for the same crime.
The dissent in Harvey cited State v. Keefe,108 an early Wyoming
case, which is similar to Harvey because in both cases the convictions

100. 112 S.Ct. 1377, 1381.

101. Id at 1382.
102. Brief of the Appellant at 7.
103. Harvey 1, 774 P.2d at 87. See, Scott Farris and Katharine Collins, Court Frees Two
Rapists for Lack of Speedy Trial CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, May 6, 1989, at A-1; Charles Levendosky, Letting Rapists Free to Protect Our Rights, CASP R STAR TRIBUNE, May 7, 1989,
A3; Harvey Makes Appearance, ROCK SPRINGS ROCKET MINER, June 13, 1989, Al; Sweetwater
County Files New Charges in Rape Case, THE SHERIDAN PRESS, July 8, 1989. See also Brief
for the Appellants, Appendix D and E.
104. 495 U.S. 508 (1990). See note 32.
105. Harvey 11, 835 P.2d 1074 (1992).
106. United States v.Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990). See text
accompanying notes
54-57.
107. Id.
108. State v. Keefe, 98 P. 122 (1908).
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were set aside by a violation of the right to speedy trial. However,
in Keefe, conspiracy charges were filed simultaneously with the underlying charges, while in Harvey the conspiracy charges were held
back. In Keefe, the Wyoming Supreme Court also set aside the conspiracy charge for a violation of the right to a speedy trial. In Harvey,
the conspiracy charges were finally tried more than four years after
Harvey was first arrested. Whether the charges are filed simultaneously or at different times, the protection against double jeopardy is
violated by successive prosecutions.
The Wyoming Supreme Court originally applied a "same element" test from Vigil v. State' °9 to double jeopardy questions. The
"same element" test was a narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment but was broadened by the court's decision in Carter v. State."0
The "same evidence" test adopted in Carter stated that a double
jeopardy violation resulted if the same evidence was used to prove
two separate charges in two separate prosecutions."'
The recent decision of Cook v. State 2 overruling Birr seems to
be a step in broadening the Wyoming Supreme Court's double jeopardy analysis. While the Harvey decision has significantly limited double jeopardy protection in Wyoming. The decision in Harvey utilizes
a test that is much narrower than the recent United States Supreme
Court cases as well as the Wyoming Supreme Court's own previous
and even more recent decisions.
A Compulsory Joinder Statute Solution
As Justice Urbigkit suggested, the solution to the problem of
inconsistent double jeopardy analysis is to adopt a compulsory joinder
statute in Wyoming. The American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice" 3 have already created a model joinder statute to
solve this problem. The model statute sets out the procedures that
should be followed if the State fails to join certain offenses."1 4 The
defense should move to have the offenses joined and if the defense
fails to make the motion, it constitutes a waiver." ' If a defendant
has been tried for one offense, he can move to dismiss any other
offenses based on the same conduct or the same criminal episode
subject to the requirements of motions to have offenses joined."16

109. 563 P.2d 1344 (Wyo. 1977). See text accompanying notes 58-60.
110. 714 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1986). See text accompanying notes 61-63.

Ill. Id. at 1218.
112. 841 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1992). See text accompanying notes 70-74.
113. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 13-2.3.
114. The American Law Institute originally adopted the Prosecution for Multiple Offenses
section in 1962 and is presently at section 1.07 in the 1985 text.
115. Id. §§ (a) and (b).
116. Id. § (c) was adopted in 1980.
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The American Law Institute has also created a model code which
provides another source for a compulsory joinder statutes:" 7
(1) Prosecutionfor Multiple Offenses: Limitation on Convictions. When the same conduct of a defendant may establish
the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may
be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not however be
convicted of more than one offense if:
(b) one offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form
of preparation to commit the other. 18
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as
rule 8(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure already permit
joinder of offenses, if they are (1) of the same or similar character, 119
(2) based on the same act or transaction, 20 or (3) based on acts or
transactions that are connected or that constitute parts of a common
scheme. 12 1 Since Wyoming already permits this type of joinder, all
that would be necessary is to make it mandatory.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution should be the overriding concern of the
and the goal should be to uphold the protections guaranteed
Constitution. "Justice for all" does not mean that the law
around the facts to get a conviction, it means that there is a
work to our legal system that must be maintained or there
justice for no one.

courts,
by the
is bent
framewill be

The Court in Green v. United States 22 stated that the reason for
the double jeopardy protection is:
that the state with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-

117. The comments state that if a single crime is involved, a separate sentencing process
for the additional crime of conspiracy is unjustified. ALL Model Penal Code part 1.
118. Section 7.06 of the Model Penal Code limits punishment as part of this statute.
119. This presents some problems with the Federal Rule of Evidence 404 that evidence of
other crimes is prohibited if it is offered to prove criminal disposition.
120. FED. R. CRrM. P. 8(a). For joinder of offenses to be based on the same transaction,
they must be temporally or logically related.
121. The reason for theses rules on joinder and severance are to protect the defendant
against prejudicial actions by the court.
122. 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
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compelling him to live in a
ment, expense and ordeal and
2
continuing state of anxiety. 1
A compulsory joinder of charges rule in Wyoming would solve the
problem. There would be no question that a defendant would be
prosecuted for all possible charges, but there would be only one proceeding.
If this statute had been in effect at the time of this prosecution,
Jetty Harvey would have been charged with conspiracy as well as the
substantive crimes. The prosecution would have known that this was
their one chance and there might not have been the initial delays that
led to the first conviction being overturned.
It is regrettable that the crime that Jetty Lee Harvey committed
would go unpunished, but United States citizens are all guaranteed
fundamental rights by the Constitution that are the basis of our legal
system. If rights like the right to be free from double jeopardy are
allowed to be circumvented because they produce an undesirable result in some instances, then there is no stability to the legal system,
and citizens can not depend on Constitutional rights.
MELISSA

E. WESTBY

123. Id.
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